A number of recent contributions to macroeconomics have centred on the idea that market economies can be stuck at an inefficiently low level of employment because of 'coordination failure' among market participants. Despite their apparent diversity, all these models share two common features (Cooper and John, I988); first, the presence of externalities or 'spillovers', meaning that individual choices affect the welfare of others directly, rather than via the market (eg. 'if I buy a fax machine, those who need to contact me are better off'); second, the existence of 'strategic complementarities', in the sense that the choice rules of individuals produce a positive correlation between their equilibrium decisions ('if I buy a fax machine, those who need to contact me may decide to buy one'). If both features are present, a model can generate multiple equilibria, characterised by different levels of activity1 -or employment, if the focus is on the labour market. A key property of these equilibria is their welfare ranking: high-employment equilibria Paretodominate low-employment ones, often called 'underemployment' equilibria.
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Obviously, with a competitive labour market, underemployment equilibria are positions of full employment at inefficiently low level or low-participation rate equilibria, as Drazen (I987) calls them. All unemployment is voluntary. However, workers who are unemployed in a low-level equilibrium are happy to work in a high-level one. If it can be eliminated by government policies, such unemployment, though voluntary, is socially wasteful.
Like the multiplicity of equilibria, also the effects of fiscal policy can be given an intuitive interpretation: policies that lower national saving lead to higher real interest rates, which depress profits and cause firms to exit the market. This triggers the process just described in reverse: exit leads to less competition, higher prices, lower real wages, employment and welfare. The fiscal shock can have two types of effects: it can either cause a local shift of the initial equilibrium or push the system to a different, inferior equilibrium. In the latter case, the economy will remain permanently trapped at the new equilibrium also after the policy is discontinued.
Although these results are obtained within a rather specific model, its implications are of more general interest for models of underemployment equilibria. The existence of such equilibria in highly stylised models has often led to the presumption that an aggregate demand expansion would be beneficial. This paper shows that, insofar as fiscal policy is concerned, this is not necessarily true. In fact, in this model, that blends the reciprocal externality among imperfectly competitive firms with a competitive model of the capital and labour market, one obtains a complete reversal of the Keynesian prescriptions for a depressed economy. On one hand, this highlights the importance of fully specifying the model of the macroeconomy before drawing policy conclusions about underemployment equilibria. On the other hand, it suggests that demand externalities due to imperfect competition, though capable of producing underemployment results, do not appear per se to hold great promise as foundation for Keynesian-type fiscal policy actions. For this, one may need additional deviations from the competitive, market-clearing standard in modelling the labour or capital market.
I. THE MODEL
The economy can be described as a version of Salop's spatial model of monopolistic competition embedded within an overlapping generation framework.6 At each date t, there are mt firms (indexed by i), n young households and n old households (indexed byj). Consumers are uniformly distributed around 5 Interestingly, a large labour supply elasticity is critical for demand externalities to have large effects on output and employment also in the models of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (I987) and Kiyotaki (i988). 6 As is well-known, these models may exhibit multiple equilibria by their very structure, but here I want to focus on the multiplicity of equilibria due to demand spillovers among imperfect competitors. Thus I choose functional forms for preferences and technology that ensure a unique steady state equilibrium under perfect competition. For the same reason, I also disregard the potential for indeterminacy of equilibrium studied by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (I986), that stems from the expectation that markets may not clear in the future (I assume that markets are expected to clear in all future periods).
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IMPERFECT COMPETITION 443 a circumference of length H, that I standardise by setting H = 2n (so that there is one consumer in each unit interval). A consumer located at a certain point on the circumference prefers the brand corresponding to that point to other brands. Firms can settle anywhere along the circumference: by settling at a point on the circumference a firm selects its brand type. The distance between consumerj and firm i at time t (denoted by 8ijt li-il) measures the distaste of consumer j for brand i relative to his most preferred one.
After locating, each firm i produces an amount qi, of the corresponding brand employing capital and labour. In equilibrium, the demand of all the households who select that brand equals this production level, i.e. YE qct = qit. Beside the mt markets corresponding to the various brands, there is a competitive market for labour, that clears at a nominal wage Wt, and one for capital, that sets the equilibrium nominal interest rate it. The rest of this section specifies the behaviour of households and firms in greater detail, and sketches the solutions to their respective choice problems and to the computation of equilibrium in the mt +2 markets of the economy. Actual derivations of the equations in the text are confined to the Appendix.
(A) Households People live for two periods. In the first period, they take three decisions: they choose if they want to work or not, how much they want to save for the next period and which brand they want to buy in the current period. In their second period, they simply spend their savings, possibly on a different brand.
Their first-period income consists of the after-tax wage Wt ( I -r) if they work and of the after-tax unemployment benefit Bt( i -r) if they do not. The decision to work is a discrete choice: everyone has an indivisible unit of labour time that can sell at the going wage. Unemployment benefits are equal to the taxes levied on the income of the young cohort, i.e. Bt(n-Lt) = [Bt(n-Lt) + Wt Lt] r, where n is the total workforce and Lt the number of employed workers. For the moment, I assume that all tax revenue is spent on unemployment benefits: government spending and debt will enter the picture in Section IV.
Households allocate part of their first-period income to consumption of their favourite brand, and save the rest. Saving takes the form of storage of physical output, that in the subsequent period is made available to firms as capital: storage by households effectively 'transforms' the heterogeneous brands purchased in period t-i into the homogeneous capital demanded by firms in period t. Each young household is assumed to save by purchasing for storage goods of the same brand that it buys for consumption,7 so that it ends up spending all of its first period disposable income on its favourite brand.
In the second period of its life, household j earns interest It,, = I + it+1 on 7 This assumption is made for analytical convenience: it makes the elasticity of demand for each brand depend only on the preferences of consumers. If instead firms could borrow from households and buy directly the output to be used subsequently as capital, different brands would have to enter as imperfect substitutes also in production, not just in consumption, and the elasticity of demand for each brand would depend on technological parameters as well. A reasonable way to motivate the assumption that households save by storing the same brand that they choose for consumption is to imagine that there is a (possibly small) fixed cost in moving to a different location to switch brand. The sub-utility function x1t attaches to the consumption of each brand i (c1jt) a weight inversely related to its 'distance' from consumer j's favourite variety (6ijt) and to the consumer's 'loyalty parameter' (a). The parameter , is the discount factor, and y1 is the disutility of wor-k effort of individualj. The y,s are assumed to be uniformly distributed across locations, so that households' labour supply choices (determined by the yjs) are independent from their brand choices (determined by their location). As we shall see, this ensures that unemployment, and thus income and demand, are uniformly spread across all the locations on the circumference (brands). Due to the additive form in which brands enter the sub-utility function xft, the marginal rate of substitution among them is constant. Thus each household demands only one brand (or is indifferent between two adjacent brands).
Denoting by i and h the two brands that household j buys in the two periods of its life, one can rewrite the utility function (i) as V(cUt) Chjt+1, 1jt) = In ct -ajt +f,(ln chct+l-a ah,t+)-yj ljt.
(2) 8 There is no stock market in this economy. Equities entitle the owner to receive the firm's profits (and oblige him to cover its losses), but cannot be traded. We can think of them as being bequeathed by each generation to the next one.
9 Alternatively, one can assume that for the recipients of profit income the disutility of work effort, y,, and thus the reservation wage, is zero (this is not implausible if capitalists are owner-managers, since they may derive utility from looking after their business). This assumption is functionally equivalent to that in the text, because it implies that, if the wage is positive, the labour-leisure choice involves only people who earn no profits. The household's decision problem then decomposes in three sequential steps: (i) inter-temporal allocation of income: maximising utility (2) subject to the budget constraint (3), one gets household j's demand for current and future consumption (c1ft and chjt+l), and, summing across households, one obtains the demand for the each brand and the aggregate level of consumption and saving;
(ii) brand choice: choosing the value of the index i (and h) so as to maximise indirect utility, each household j selects its preferred brand, that -not surprisingly -turns out to be that closest to its location; (iii) labour supply choice: each individual selects a reservation wage,10 again by maximising his indirect utility function; ranking people by ascending values of their work disutility y,, and thus of their reservation wage, one obtains the aggregate (inverse) labour supply function, whose shape depends on the distribution of y3 in the population. This distribution, to be denoted by y(Lt), relates each value of the disutility of effort to the number of workers Lt with disutility lower than (or equal to) that value.
(B) Firms Each firm takes two decisions:
(i) the pricing decision: it sets the profit-maximising price Pit (and the corresponding supply qit), taking its competitors' prices as given and knowing that the number of its customers is a decreasing function of its price;
(ii) the choice of technique: it selects the profit-maximising combination of labour and capital to be used in production.
For convenience, I assume that capital and labour are transformed into output according to a Cobb-Douglas function, but that there is a critical scale levelf below which no output is obtained:
The assumption of a setup cost (that is equivalent to that of increasing returns) creates an entry barrier that endogenously pins down the number of firms operating at zero-profit equilibria. In its absence, at zero profits the number of firms would be unbounded and the imperfectly competitive feature of the economy would vanish (see also Weitzman (i982) on this point).
10 The labour supply decision turns out to depend only on the real wage, the level of the unemployment subsidy and on preference parameters, such as the disutility of work effort. If the leisure term were not restricted to be additive in the utility function, the labour-leisure choice would depend also on the real interest rate and the variety of available goods. This gain in generality would make the analysis considerably more intricate, obscuring the presentation of the results. In particular, if labour supply Lt were to depend also on the real interest rate, the dynamic representation of the economy (see equations 8-I 2 below) would be quite different: it would turn to be a system of second-order difference equations, rather than a first-order system (as in equations I9-20 below). I thank a referee for raising this point. 
Equating the demand for capital (6) with the supply of saving (7) 
I+ i) . (i6)
The fact that in this economy a larger real wage is consistent with higher employment can be explained heuristically as follows. More employment raises demand, output and profits, inducing entry. The latter leads to lower prices, implying that the initial increase in employment is consistent with a higher real wage. Hence the positive slope of the 'labour demand' locus LL, which is the analogue, in this model, of the positive relationship between employment and 1 If instead I-a < -, the locus has a C-shape: its slope is negative for low values of w,, corresponding to low real income (wt Lt), low number of firms and high markup rate (aH/mt), and eventually turns positive for higher values of wt. This case is worth mentioning because it can produce two equilibria even if labour supply is totally inelastic: since the LL has a C-shape, a vertical L(wt) line can intersect it at two different levels of the real wage. This is in contrast with what happens in the monotone increasing case i -a > (see text, below). Since realism suggests that labour has the larger share in factor income, in the text I concentrate on the monotone case I -a > 2 In either case, the LL locus has an upper finite asymptote at w* = real wage across zero-profit equilibria found by Weitzman (i982) and Solow (i984) in their one-period model. In fact, since LL is a zero-profit locus, the points above it are wage-employment combinations that imply losses (the wage is too high for firms to break even at that employment level), whereas the points below it are associated with profits.12 What pins down the number of equilibria is the shape of the labour supply curve L(wt) -the missing equation of the Weitzman-Solow model. For multiple equilibria to arise, the aggregate supply of labour must be elastic, at least if the LL locus is upward-sloping everywhere (i.e. if I-OC > )."13 The isoelastic case (Lt = Aw") is shown in Fig. I a. Here there can be up to three equilibria, one of which is at zero activity level, provided the elasticity parameter is large enough (e > 2 (I -a) -) . If the elasticity changes over the domain of the labour supply function, the number of equilibria can be greater, as shown by Fig. I b, where labour supply is still continuous, and by Fig. I C, where it is stepwise, implying an elasticity switching discretely between o and infinity. The latter occurs when workers cluster in groups with different reservation wages (all members of a group having the same work disutility y.).
Beside changes in the elasticity of labour supply, another factor that can increase the number of equilibria is the existence of firms with different fixed costs, as in Chatterjee and Cooper (i 988) .14 So far all firms have been assumed to face the same costf to start production. Assume instead that they fall in K 'cost classes', each formed by mk firms and ranked by increasing values of the fixed costfk (i.e. 
and viceversa. This condition coincides with that for local stability, as will be seen in the next section.
12 One can show that profits zrt are decreasing in the real wage wt (for given employment Lt) by total differentiation of (8), (9) The analysis presented so far, by centring on the labour market, reveals most graphically the relationship of this model to that by Weitzman and Solow: the LL locus brings out the same positive relationship between real wage and employment that is present in their model, while the labour supply L(wt), absent from their model, pins down the equilibria. Fiscal policy and dynamics are, however, much easier to analyse by focussing on the capital market, rather than on the labour market. To this purpose, one can recast the analysis so far performed in (Lt, wt) space in (Rt, mt) space, and present it in terms of two relationships between the real rate of interest and the number of firms. The first of these relationships is that of capital market equilibrium, already derived above in (I 4), and displayed in Fig. 2 a as The points of intersection between the ZZ and the RR locus are zero-profit, steady-state equilibria: higher activity equilibria feature a larger number of 15 Intuitively, the reason why the slope of the zero-profit locus is ambiguous can be put as follows. Above this curve profits are positive, and below it firms incur losses, because an increase in the real interest Rt for given mt lowers profits 7Tt -from (9), (i o) and (i12). A higher number of firms mt, instead, has two opposite effects on profits (for given Rt). It lowers them by reducing the markup rate, and it boosts them by raising real labour income and thus demand. This increase in labour income comes about as the combination of an increase in the real wage (due to the fall in prices) and of its effect on employment. This is where the elasticity of labour supply comes in. The larger it is, the stronger is the expansion of employment and labour income, and the more likely it is that the second effect will prevail. If so, the increase in mt tends to increase profits, and must be balanced by a higher interest Rt o profits to stay zero, implying a rising ZZ locus. Vice-versa, if the elasticity of labour supply is low, the first effect prevails, and ZZ slopes downwards.
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IMPERFECT COMPETITION 453 firms and the same interest rate. This is illustrated in Fig. 2a, that shows the same case that Fig. I b displayed in (wt, Lt) space. Now condition (I 7) is satisfied at the equilibria where the ZZ locus crosses the RR line from above, such as e3, and is violated otherwise, i.e. in points like e2. The welfare ranking of equilibria is immediate in this model. Consider moving from a low to a high-level equilibrium. The latter features a higher real wage, a higher employment level and the same real interest rate. For workers who were employed also in the low-level equilibrium, lifetime resources increase and the disutility of work does not change, so there is an unambiguous welfare increase. For newly employed workers, the real wage exceeds the disutility of working and of losing the unemployment subsidy, or they would not supply their labour. So they are better off too. For the others, who stay unemployed also in the higher-level equilibrium, welfare is unchanged. In conclusion, the higher-level equilibrium Pareto-dominates the other.
The implication is that policies capable of shifting the economy to such an equilibrium are welfare-improving. To show that such policies are needed, however, one must first show that at least some of the low-level equilibria are stable, so that market forces will not themselves promote the transition to a superior equilibrium. I turn to this issue in the next section.
III. STABILITY
Outside of steady-state, zero-profit equilibria, the existence of profits (or losses) causes firms to enter (or exit) the market. The entry process (i i) thus mingles with the dynamics intrinsic in the capital market equilibrium condition (8). The entry equation (i i) can be seen as a simple approximation to a more complex game-theoretic story by which entrants, attracted by profits, fight a price war with existing firms until these accept to move aside in the product spectrum. The costs involved in this adjustment process suggests that entry tends to occur gradually over time, rather than as a one-shot response.
For simplicity, I assume that, around the relevant equilibrium point, labour supply is isoelastic (Lt = Aw6). This does not affect the generality of the results, since these are obtained by linearising around steady-state values. With some manipulations, the system formed by (8) Fig. 2b shows the laws of motion of the economy for this case: stable and unstable equilibria alternate, the saddle path of the latter acting as boundary between stable regions.
IV. FISCAL POLICY
Now let us introduce fiscal policy into the picture. The only redistributive scheme considered so far is the transfer from employed to unemployed workers. That scheme is neutral with respect to saving choices, because it redistributes income among the young, who have the same propensity to consume. In this section, instead, I analyse the non-neutral fiscal actions: a balanced-budget and a debt-financed increase in public spending. Consider first the case of a balanced-budget rise in spending. Besides levying taxes at rate T to pay for unemployment benefits, the government starts a new spending scheme and finances it with an additional tax, levied at rate t. I suppose that the spending scheme consists of transfers to the old generation. This avoids the complications that would arise if the government did the spending itself (thus generally altering the elasticity of demand for individual brands), while capturing the essential point: since the propensity to consume of the old equals I, the transfer produces an increase in spending.
Taxes are levied on the income of the young -an innocuous assumption, since any revenue collected from the old would be eventually rebated to them anyway. I suppose that taxes are paid at the same rate out of wage income or unemployment compensation (so as to avoid feedbacks on labour supply choices), and that each old household receives a transfer equal to the taxes paid when young. The taxes paid for the unemployment subsidy are deductible from the base of the new tax. Under these assumptions, it is easy to show that the after-tax real income of the young is simply (i -t) wt Lt."6 In other words, the transfer from employed to unemployed leaves the aggregate income of the young unaffected, and only the new tax (levied at rate t) lowers the disposable income of the young as a group.
The tax unambiguously decreases saving, as it lowers the disposable income of the young and raises by the same amount that of the old. This is clearly seen by rewriting the capital market equilibrium condition ( As one would expect, for t = o this expression for the equilibrium real interest reverts to (I 4). Graphically, a balanced budget expansion shifts up the RR line, and leaves the ZZ locus unchanged, as shown in Fig. 3a . Thus, if the economy is stuck at the low-level equilibrium el, increasing aggregate demand via a balanced-budget expansion moves it to point e', and thus reduces output, employment and the real wage, that are all positively related to m .17 Intuitively, the fall in aggregate saving, by raising the real rate of interest and thus the cost of capital, leads to lower profits and exit, and thus to higher markups and lower wages, as well as to lower employment.
Welfare will be unambiguously lower at the new steady-state position if the initial value of the real interest rate is non-negative, i.e. Rt > i, and may be lower even if this condition is not met (see proof in the Appendix)." Since the balanced budget expansion reduces saving and thus the aggregate capital stock, it is not surprising to find that it lowers welfare if the real interest rate is positive. It is known since Diamond's (I965) classic work that in overlapping generation models capital decumulation reduces welfare when the rate of interest exceeds the rate of population growth, that in this instance is zero. What is novel here is that this condition is just sufficient, rather than necessary and sufficient: even if the real interest rate is negative, the capital decumulation due to the fiscal expansion can lower welfare, rather than raise it. This is because in this model imperfect competition introduces an additional imperfection relative to standard overlapping generations models, reinforcing the welfare loss due to capital decumulation. Here a smaller capital stock means a lower number of firms and thus a larger departure from the competitive outcome, as well as less product variety for consumers.
The type of experiment just considered is a policy change with 'local' effects. In a model with multiple equilibria, however, changes in policy variables can also cause the economy to pass through a critical point. In this case the policy change is said to have 'catastrophic' effects, in the sense that it moves the economy to a totally different set of equilibria (see Cooper I987 for an explicit game-theoretic formulation of this distinction). In our context, a catastrophic effect takes place if the government engineers a balanced-budget reduction such that the RR' locus passes below the critical point p* (see Fig. 3 b) . In this case the tax and expenditure reduction is so large that the low-level equilibrium actually disappears from the map, and the economy moves towards the stable equilibrium e'.19 This implies that a policy-maker can move the economy permanently to a superior equilibrium via a temporary balanced-budget restriction. If then the government resumes the initial policy stance, the economy will proceed towards point e3. From Section II we know that equilibrium e3 always Paretodominates e1, as it features a higher real wage and the same real interest rate.
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Thus a temporary fiscal restriction can secure a permanent welfare gain. The converse is also true, unfortunately. A temporary fiscal expansion can produce a permanent move to an inferior equilibrium. Not surprisingly, the analysis of a deficit-financed increase in public expenditure runs along similar lines. Assume that the government decide5 a one-time expenditure G and finances it via the issue of debt (G = D), so that in the capital market equilibrium condition (2I) the left-hand side must be modified by adding public debt D to the demand for capital by firms. In steady state, the government budget constraint implies that debt servicing must be met by taxes, that for convenience I assume again to fall on the young. Thus the tax rate t has to satisfy the condition twtLt = (Rt -I) D. Using this condition and simplifying, the capital market equilibrium condition becomes R+ t= (24) in a zero-profit steady state. With debt-financing, the increase of the real interest rate results not only from the reduction of the supply of saving due to taxes but also from the crowding out of private capital by public debt D. Graphically, the debt-financed expansion has the same qualitative effect as a balanced-budget expansion. It shifts the RR line up and leaves the ZZ locus unaffected, leading to a fall in output, employment and the number of firms, and also in welfare if the real interest rate is positive. Conversely, just as a balanced-budget reduction, a policy that uses budget surpluses to foster capital accumulation (ranging from retirement of public debt to tax-financed public investment) can shift the economy to a higher-level equilibrium.
V. CONCLUSION
Until recently, the prevailing views of unemployment have been the Walrasian view, that explains it as the result of intertemporal substitution of leisure or misperceptions of nominal shocks, and the Keynesian view, that attributes unemployment to the slow adjustment of nominal wages and prices. As noted by Cooper and John (I988), coordination failure models have lately emerged as a potential third contender in the field. The point made by these models is that reciprocal externalities and strategic complementarities between economic agents can generate multiple equilibria characterised by different levels of unemployment, and that in the absence of adequate policy intervention the economy can be persistently stuck at equilibria with high unemployment. The implications of coordination failure models for macroeconomic policy are still largely unexplored. Though in general supportive of the idea that policy intervention can increase welfare, these models are rarely used to study which policy scheme is required, probably because they are still too stylised for this type of analysis. The natural step to take is to enrich their structure, so as to allow the comparison with mainstream macroeconomic models and their pplicy prescriptions.
